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11 
REFINING CRAWFORD: THE CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE AFTER DAVIS V. WASHINGTON 
AND HAMMON V. INDIANA 
Andrew C. Fine*† 
Introduction 
Clarification of the Supreme Court’s newly minted interpretation of the 
Confrontation Clause was desperately needed, and Davis v. Washington and 
Hammon v. Indiana promised to provide it. Two terms earlier, in Crawford 
v. Washington, the Supreme Court had worked a revolutionary transforma-
tion of Confrontation Clause analysis by overruling Ohio v. Roberts and 
severing the link between hearsay jurisprudence and the Clause. Crawford 
was hailed by the criminal defense bar, since it seemed to presage a sharp 
reduction in the frequency of so-called “victimless” trials by holding that 
“testimonial” hearsay, no matter how reliable, was constitutionally inadmis-
sible in the absence of an opportunity to cross-examine, and further ruling 
that statements elicited through police “interrogation” were testimonial. But 
the Court refused to define the terms “testimonial” and “interrogation,” leav-
ing lower courts with little guidance when evaluating the circumstances in 
which unconfronted early accusations of crime could provide the basis for 
prosecution. And it listed, as a potential definition of “testimonial,” the nar-
row formulation urged by Justice Thomas in his concurring opinion in White 
v. Illinois that would only cover statements contained in “formalized” mate-
rials, which if accepted would exclude very few early accusations. 
Davis, involving a 911 call by a woman who claimed her former boy-
friend had beaten her, and Hammon, involving a wife’s statements to police 
(who had responded to the scene of a reported domestic disturbance) that 
accused her husband of assaulting her, promised at least to lessen lower 
courts’ confusion. And since both cases involved accusations of domestic 
violence, where complainants often become reluctant to testify, they carried 
the potential for clarifying the extent to which many prosecutions could pro-
ceed without confrontation. 
In an opinion which, like Crawford, was authored by Justice Scalia, the 
Court unanimously held that the Davis declarant’s accusatorial statements in 
the initial portion of her 911 call were nontestimonial, but ruled by a vote of 
8-1, with Justice Thomas dissenting, that the wife’s statements in Hammon 
were testimonial. Unfortunately, however, perhaps due to the desire to 
achieve a broad majority coalition, the Court adopted a standard for assess-
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ing what sort of police “interrogations” produce testimonial statements that 
is so amorphous that it is likely to lead to the same kind of unpredictability 
for which the Crawford Court condemned Roberts. And at least on the sur-
face, the opinion oddly focused on the primary purpose of the interrogator, 
considered objectively, rather than the motive or reasonable expectation of 
the declarant, whose status as a “witness” under the Confrontation Clause is 
at issue. 
Despite its lack of analytical clarity, Davis is likely to lead lower courts 
to hold more early accusatory statements to police to be testimonial. The 
opinion seems to recognize the testimonial character of most crime-scene 
statements made to police in domestic violence cases and even more so in 
prosecutions for street crime. And the Court flatly rejected Justice Thomas’s 
“formality” test, thereby overruling the rationale used by most lower courts 
that had held statements like those at issue in Hammon to be nontestimonial 
in Crawford’s aftermath. Nevertheless, the number of “victimless” trials 
may not decline significantly, for two reasons. First, the holding in Davis 
makes it clear that accusatory statements made during the preliminary por-
tion of 911 calls, before the operator can ascertain whether there is a 
continuing emergency, are nontestimonial. Second, the opinion encourages 
expansive application of the doctrine of forfeiture by misconduct, which 
may well result in many testimonial accusations not subject to cross-
examination being admitted through the back door. 
I. The DAVIS Analysis 
The Court’s self-described holding ignores the declarant’s motive or ex-
pectation, and focuses instead on an objective assessment of the “primary 
purpose” of the police questioning: if it is to “enable police assistance to 
meet an ongoing emergency,” an ensuing statement is nontestimonial, but if 
the circumstances “objectively indicate” that there is no ongoing emergency 
and that the “primary purpose” of the questioning is to “establish . . . past 
events potentially relevant to later . . . prosecution,” the response is testimo-
nial. This standard is analytically problematic: though the purpose of the 
Crawford inquiry is to determine whether the declarant should be treated as 
a “witness” under the Confrontation Clause, the Court nevertheless ostensi-
bly requires lower courts to resolve that decisive question from a perspective 
that renders the declarant’s motive or reasonable expectation irrelevant.  
Moreover, even though the Court asks judges to evaluate the surround-
ing circumstances, rather than the officer’s actual motivation, and declares 
that police “saying that an emergency exists cannot make it be so,” its test 
nevertheless creates the potential for police manipulation. When determin-
ing the “primary purpose” of questioning, it will be difficult for courts to 
ignore an officer’s claim that he believed the emergency to be ongoing when 
he questioned the declarant, just as it has always been difficult for courts in 
the context of Fourth Amendment issues, where the standard is similarly 
objective, to ignore an officer’s assertion that he frisked the defendant be-
cause he believed him to be armed. More insidiously, the decision could 
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lead some police to question victims of domestic violence before ensuring 
their safety, in a desire to collect evidence from a declarant who may subse-
quently become reluctant to cooperate. 
Practically, the difficulty of ascertaining the “primary purpose” of police 
questioning, even under an objective test, is virtually self-evident. Justice 
Thomas, dissenting in part, aptly points out that in most cases where police 
conduct questioning shortly after a crime, their purposes are both to respond 
to the potential emergency and to collect evidence in anticipation of a prose-
cution, and the task of discerning which purpose is “primary” will be a 
formidable one.  
Other language in the Court’s opinion, however, suggests strongly that 
the declarant’s reasonable expectation or motive may also be important in 
evaluating a statement’s testimonial status. Thus, Justice Scalia writes that 
the 911 call in Davis was “plainly a call for help,” and that the declarant 
“simply was not acting as a witness,” or “testifying.” Even more directly, the 
opinion declares in two footnotes that “it is in the final analysis the decla-
rant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation 
Clause requires us to evaluate,” and that “police conduct” cannot “govern 
the Confrontation Clause; testimonial statements are what they are.” It is 
therefore not surprising that in the immediate aftermath of Davis, the West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in holding an alleged domestic violence 
victim’s complaint to police shortly after the event to be testimonial in State 
v. Mechling, interpreted Crawford and Davis as requiring courts to “focus 
more upon the witness’s statement, and less upon any interrogator’s ques-
tions.” 
The Court’s rejection of Justice Thomas’s test in White, to which he ad-
hered in his opinion in Davis, that would have required a statement to be 
“formalized” to qualify as testimonial, eliminates concerns that Crawford’s 
promise would be extinguished by an exceedingly narrow construction. As 
Justice Scalia recognized, “[r]estricting the Confrontation Clause to the pre-
cise forms against which it was originally directed is a recipe for its 
extinction.”  
The Court addressed the status of statements not made in response to 
police interrogation only in a footnote. It recognized there that such state-
ments are testimonial under certain circumstances, stating that neither 
“volunteered testimony” nor “answers to open-ended questions” are exempt 
from cross-examination. And its pronouncement that in any case, it is ulti-
mately “the declarant’s statements” that must be evaluated, lends force to 
the argument that the testimonial character of statements not obtained 
through police questioning should be determined by examining whether the 
declarant reasonably expected them to be used prosecutorially. 
Regarding other issues that have arisen under Crawford, the Court spe-
cifically reserved the questions of whether statements made to non-law 
enforcement government personnel or private citizens may be testimonial. 
However, it suggested that it may answer the latter question affirmatively in 
some instances by referring favorably to the 1779 English common law rul-
ing in King v. Brasier, which excluded the accusatory statements of a young 
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rape victim to her mother “immediately [upon] coming home” after the in-
cident. Regarding the character of business records and public records 
generated for law enforcement purposes, the Court’s approving reference to 
its 1911 decision in Dowdell v. United States suggests that documents pre-
pared without awareness of their potential use in a specific prosecution are 
not testimonial, at least if they do not pertain to a defendant’s “guilt or inno-
cence.” 
Davis also sounded the death knell for the last vestige of Roberts. The 
Davis opinion characterized the threshold question as whether the Clause 
“applies only to testimonial hearsay,” noted that the text of the Clause only 
addresses “testimonial” statements, and then concluded that “[a] limitation 
so clearly reflected in the text of the constitutional provision must fairly be 
said to mark out not merely its ‘core,’ but its perimeter.” 
II. DAVIS’S Likely Impact 
The Court’s factual discussion of Hammon should make it difficult for 
lower courts in domestic violence cases to conclude that an emergency is 
ongoing for the purpose of determining a statement’s testimonial status 
when the officer questions the declarant at the scene of the event. The opin-
ion does state that in domestic disputes, exigent circumstances may well 
persist after the triggering occurrence, and that this “may often mean that 
‘initial inquiries’ produce nontestimonial statements.” In determining that 
Amy Hammon’s statements to police were testimonial, however, the Court 
focused on the absence of observable indications of a continuing emergency 
at the Hammon household. It emphasized that the officer in Hammon had 
not heard “arguments or crashing,” or seen anyone “throw or break any-
thing,” and thereby concluded that the officer questioning Mrs. Hammon 
was seeking to determine “what happened” rather than “what is happening.” 
Though the opinion noted that Mrs. Hammon first told the police that 
“things were fine,” the Court’s primary emphasis was on the officer’s elicita-
tion of information regarding past events.  
This discussion should result in the classification of most statements 
elicited by police at the scene of a domestic disturbance as testimonial, 
unless it is readily apparent to the responding officer that the event is still in 
progress when questioning begins. And the Court evinced its general belief 
that most such statements are testimonial by declaring that its task in decid-
ing Hammon was a “much easier” one than in Davis. Even regarding 911 
calls, the Court concluded that “it could readily be maintained” that after the 
911 operator determined that Davis had left the premises, the answers to her 
ensuing questions were testimonial. 
Outside the context of domestic violence, the Court’s focus on whether 
an emergency situation persists should prove even more helpful to defen-
dants in cases involving statements made at the scene of street crimes, 
though in this situation Confrontation Clause claims should be less frequent 
because the declarant is more likely to testify at trial. In such cases, the de-
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fendant usually will have fled the scene before the police arrive, rendering 
fatuous any claim of a continuing emergency.  
Despite these indicators that the Court meant to signal that the right to 
confrontation should be zealously protected, its seeming approval of a broad 
conception of the forfeiture doctrine may serve to undermine that intention. 
Though the Court purported to “take no position on the standards necessary 
to demonstrate . . . forfeiture,” it proceeded to (1) note that most state and 
federal courts have required the prosecution, in order to invoke forfeiture, to 
demonstrate by a mere preponderance of the evidence that the defendant 
procured a witness’s absence, and (2) quote approvingly a Massachusetts 
decision seeming to permit the prosecution to rely on the declarant’s out-of-
court statements themselves when determining their admissibility. Some 
jurisdictions do not allow this sort of circularity in resolving forfeiture is-
sues, and require the prosecution to demonstrate the defendant’s 
responsibility for the declarant’s absence by clear and convincing evidence. 
The Court also said nothing about enforcing a stringent requirement of wit-
ness unavailability, as mandated by Federal Rule of Evidence 804, before 
invoking forfeiture. Without such a requirement, and under the flimsy pro-
cedural safeguards that the Court seems to be encouraging, many courts are 
likely to admit early accusations of crime, testimonial or not, without regard 
to the declarant’s presence. 
